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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past few years, the licensing dispute between Philips and
Taiwan CD-R and CD-RW manufacturers, such as Princo and
Gigastorage, has been a powerful generator of new developments in the
field of patent and competition in various countries around the world.
For instance, in Germany, it stimulated the Supreme Court to deal with
the applicability of antitrust defenses to injunctive relief in the context
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of patent infringement lawsuits, the issue that the same court left open
in its Standard-Spundfass decision in 2004. The Court made use of this
occasion—the Orange-Book-Standard case in 2009—to opine upon
contending positions on that issue, and ruled for further extending
antitrust defenses to injunctive relief claims, and meanwhile, set up
prerequisites for raising such defenses on the basis of abusing dominant
1
positions by refusal to license.
In Taiwan, where the present series of controversies initially burst
out, the Fair Trade Commission is the key enforcer of antitrust law. In
2001, the Commission found that Philips maintained an excessive
royalty rate as to patents that were essential for local manufacturers to
comply with CD-R/CD-RW specifications—the Orange Book
standards—and, consequently, abused its monopolistic position in the
2
technology market. This case represents a very rare instance where a
monopolist was held to be abusing its intellectual property (IP)
exploitatively, and, until now, was still under dispute in Taiwan judicial

1.
Gerhard Barth, Patentees Beware German Antitrust Rules, MANAGING
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
(July
1,
2009),
http://www.managingip.com/IssueArticle/2251033/Supplements/Patentees-beware-Germanantitrust-rules.html?supplementListId=72637.
2. Philips refused to renegotiate the royalty rate that Taiwan manufacturers originally
agreed upon, namely, three-percent of the net sales price, but at least 10 Japanese Yen for
each CD-R disk. Kung-Chung Liu, Rationalising the Regime of Compulsory Patent Licensing
by the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 757, 761
(2008) (hereinafter Liu, Compulsory Patent Licensing); Kung-Chung Liu, Interface Between
IP and Competition Law in Taiwan, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 735, 748 (2005) (hereinafter
Liu, Interface); Ming-Yan Shieh, A Discussion of the Relationship Between the Patent Law
and the Fair Trade Law in Taiwan with a Review of the Philips CD-R Decisions, THE FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION FRAMEWORK 155, 161–62 (Tzong-Leh Hwang & Chiyuan
Chen eds., 2004). Nevertheless, due to drastic price erosion (from US$ 7 for each CD-R in
1996 to less than US$ 0.5 in 2000) and the sixty-fold growth in sales volume (from 182 million
CD-Rs in 1997 to 3.6 billion in 2000), the maintenance of such a scheme would generate
royalties twenty to sixty times more in 2000 than the amount originally expected by both sides
of the parties. Liu, Interface, supra note 2, at 748–49. Judge Dyk also noted in his dissent
from the Princo v. ITC en banc rehearing opinion that “[t]he royalty rate has ranged from
one-half to two-thirds the manufacturers' selling price for the discs. This has enabled Philips
and the other members of the patent pool to collectively secure hundreds-of-millions, if not
billions, of dollars in revenue from the sale of those discs.” Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d
1318, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting). For other issues disposed in the
commission decision including cartel and tying arrangement see TU THANH NGUYEN,
COMPETITION LAW, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 204–06 (2010); Shieh, supra note 2, at 162;
Bruce Y. Hsueh & Morris Tu, Application of Market Level Analysis in Anti-Trust Regulation
on IP Licensing—The Philips CD-R Case in Taiwan, 23 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT'L L. &
AFF. 73, 73–76 (2005); Liu, Interface, supra note 2, at 747–49.
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3

proceedings. Additionally, the Taiwan Intellectual Property Office
once granted compulsory licenses on Philips’ patents at dispute to local
CD-R producers, but was later reversed on appeal and vacated by the
4
Taipei Administrative High Court.
Turning back to the United States, the Philips CD-R/CD-RW
licensing dispute arose chiefly from the exclusionary order proceedings,
which is a court-style procedure administered by the U.S. International
Trade Commission (ITC) aiming to forestall IP-infringing products from
5
entering into the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Fed. Cir.) possesses appellate jurisdiction over this class
of cases arising from the ITC proceedings, as it does in patent
6
infringement ligation. Since 2005, the Fed. Cir. brought out three
consecutive major decisions adjudicating the present dispute,
7
culminating at the Princo Corporation v. ITC en banc decision in 2010.
These decisions substantially changed the landscape of the patentmisuse doctrine in general, and tying arrangement as a defense to patent
infringement litigation in particular. They broke away from the
traditional dichotomy between coercion and voluntariness in judging the
8
legitimacy of mandatory package licenses. Instead, in the Philips-series
cases, the Fed. Cir. consistently held that tying arrangements between
patents should be analyzed under rule of reason, and put emphasis on
actual or probable foreclosure of both technically and commercially
9
viable alternative technologies.
What is unique in the Princo en banc rehearing decision is that the

3. Liu, Compulsory Patent Licensing, supra note 2, 761–62; NGUYEN, supra note 2, at
206; Ching-fu Lin, Filling in the Gaps of the TRIPS Agreement: Reflections on the TaiwanPhilips CD-R Compulsory License Case, 3 ASIAN J WTO & INT’L HEALTH LAW & POL’Y
556, 563–64 (2008).
4. NGUYEN, supra note 2, at 209–10; Lin, supra note 3, at 561–62; Liu, Interface, supra
note 2, at 739–41.
5. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(a)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006).
6. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006).
7. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Princo Corp. v. ITC, 563 F.3d
1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
8. The Supreme Court laid down this dichotomy in two decisions dealing with
basically the same license scheme. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research Inc.,
339 U.S. 827 (1950); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). See
also 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.3a, at 3–24 to 3–29 (2d ed.
2010).
9. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1337–39; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1314–15 (citing U.S.
Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at
1188–94.
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court expanded the impact that the present dispute brought about
concerning the entire array of patent-misuse. The majority of the Fed.
Cir. unequivocally held that only restrictions on the licensee’s use of the
10
patented invention would possibly constitute patent misuse.
Consequently, any other type of restriction or extension caused by the
patent owners in exercising their patent rights is eliminated from the
11
reach of the patent-misuse doctrine. The court went even further in
this decision, holding that antitrust violations based on patent rights do
not unavoidably constitute patent-misuse at the same time, even if with
that violation the owner extends the patent grant out of the metes and
12
bounds of the claims recited in the same patents. Those two separate
but related rulings significantly curtailed the formerly applicable scope
of the misuse doctrine, and as a result, substantially undermined its
imperative function as a counterweight guarding against overreaching
patent exploitation and infringement allegations.
The goal of this article is to review these two far-reaching holdings in
the en banc decision. The author will explore their implications for
patent law and market competition, and make meticulous assessments
and reflections from doctrinal, policy, and functional dimensions. As a
matter of fact, the court still delivered a third ruling in the same
decision. The majority concluded that for a misuse defense to prevail
based on agreement to suppress nascent technologies, the defendant has
to prove that absent this suppress-and-non-compete agreement, the
nascent technologies should have enjoyed reasonable probabilities to
turn into technically and commercially viable alternatives to the
13
patented inventions. Although the double viability requirement that
the court put forward may also perversely affect the function of the
misuse doctrine and is therefore worthy of examination, it would be
more preferable to leave this critical and broadly-related issue for a
separate and more focused investigation on a future day.
On the substance of the en banc decision, following careful
examination of relevant statutes, case law, and their respective

10. On the two issues summarized in this paragraph, the majority of the court
composed of six judges: Chief Judge Rader, and Judges Bryson, Newman, Lourie, Linn, and
Moore; Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1321. The dissenters, Judges Dyk and Gajarsa, vigorously
opposed the majority’s view. See id. at 1342 (Dyk, J., dissenting). The concurring judges,
Judges Prost and Mayer, casted doubt on the majority’s holdings, but preferred not to make
rulings on those issues. See id. at 1341 (Prost, J., concurring).
11. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1330–33.
12. Id. at 1329–30, 1333 n.6.
13. Id. at 1336–37.
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reasoning and fundamental policy concerns, this article proceeds to
argue that the Fed. Cir.’s first two rulings regarding the applicable scope
of the patent-misuse doctrine deviated from both Supreme Court and
past Fed. Cir. precedent. However, except for fact patterns summarized
from many of the precedents but relatively trivial to the primary
principles of the misuse doctrine, there is nothing in the present decision
providing adequate and sufficient reasoning for this breakaway from
settled case law. Nor did the court proffer any meaningful policy
grounds for this sudden turn on the law of misuse. Taking into account
the possible polymorphism of the ways in which the patentees misuse
their patent rights, which are difficult to predict ex ante and classify
beforehand to certain fixed categories, the holdings of the en banc
decision holding back the misuse doctrine to categories that have
previously appeared in judicial opinions do not seem to be sound and
well-deliberated decisions from a policy perspective.
Furthermore, the Fed. Cir. did not answer the core question that will
occur as to the rulings on the scope of the misuse doctrine. The key
problem that commentators may doubt is why those restrictions based
on patent rights, imposed on parties other than the licensees but still
contravening the antitrust laws and causing considerable
anticompetitive harm to the economic welfare of our society, will never
be considered as misuse of patent rights? In other words, the
fundamental inquiry resulting from the holdings is how patent abuse
targeted against non-licensees would never be misuse under patent law?
The court did not provide any conceivable clue in the majority opinion
to answer this question, nor did it articulate its reason for viewing this
type of misuse more condemnable than other types of restraints on
trade. It also failed to proffer any grounds for maintaining double
remedies from patent and antitrust law only for misuse on licensees, but
not for misuse residing otherwise. From a functional viewpoint, these
mismatches create apparent disparities in the strength of legal
protection and practical remedies against similar patent-abusing
behaviors. Without comprehensible justification, the Fed. Cir. suddenly
retreated in this decision from a heated battlefield that is in need of
regulation by the patent-misuse doctrine, at least as much regulation as
is afforded in other areas where the court chooses to keep faithful to the
commitment of enforcing patent-misuse.
This article is poised to expand and develop those substantive
observations into full-fledged investigation and comprehensive
assessment on this momentous judicial decision. The rest of this
comment will be organized in the following manner. In Part I the
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author will briefly describe the Philips CD-R/CR-RW dispute and the
technologies at issue in this en banc decision. Next, in Part II to Part IV,
this article will review and evaluate the court’s rulings from doctrinal,
policy, and functional viewpoints, respectively, as summarized in the
preceding paragraphs.
The possible counter argument will be
considered and carefully analyzed in Part V, and Part VI will be a short
summary and conclusion.
II. PHILIPS CD-R/CR-RW DISPUTE AND THE EN BANC DECISION
Philips, Sony, and two other companies (Taiyo Yuden and Ricoh)
own patents concerning the production of recordable compact discs
14
(CD-R) and rewritable compact discs (CD-RW).
Many of those
patents cover technologies used on CD-R and CD-RW discs that are
indispensible for them to comply with the “Orange Book,” a technical
specification jointly developed by Philips and Sony in the late 1980s and
15
early 1990s. In producing CD-Rs and CD-RWs, manufacturers have to
follow the Orange Book standard to assure the compatibility of those
discs with CD drives set up on computers and consumer electronics,
including audio and video systems installed on cars or at home, which
16
are also manufactured in accordance with the Orange Book standard.
In the early 1990s, the companies agreed to aggregate their Orange
Book-related patents to configure patent pools for the ease of
17
management and outward licensing. Philips, Sony, and Taiyo Yuden
pooled respective CD-R patents and brought out a joint package license
18
for those patents. Ricoh, Sony, and Philips also concentrated CD-RW
19
patents and licensed them out in a similar manner. In return for a
share of royalties from the pools, Sony, Taiyo Yuden, and Ricoh
authorized Philips to run the two pools and to grant package licenses to
worldwide manufacturers who produced Orange-Book compliant discs,
20
drives, and players. Interested licensees could only choose among the
package licenses put forth by Philips; individual patents were not
21
offered for licensing. Those package licenses required manufacturers
14. Id. at 1344; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
15. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
16. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1321–22; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303; Hsueh & Tu,
supra note 2, at 74; Shieh, supra note 2, at 161.
17. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
18. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1343; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
19. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1343; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
20. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1343; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
21. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303; U.S. Philips Corp.
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to pay a per-disc royalty on each CD-R or CD-RW sold where at least
22
one licensed invention was in use during the production process. The
per-disc royalty did not vary in portion to which, or how many technical
aspects covered by licensed patents actually found themselves in
producing the discs, “meaning that licensees must pay a royalty based
on the number of discs manufactured regardless of how many of the
23
patents are actually used in the manufacturing.”
One aspect of the CD-R/RW patented technology is actually at issue
24
in the en banc case. In order for a CD player to adequately locate its
reader or writer when reading or writing data onto the compact discs,
all-time position information has to be encoded onto CD-Rs and CD25
RWs to ensure accurate positioning of the player. In the course of
developing the Orange Book standard, the Sony and Philips engineers
discovered this problem and configured different solutions to deal with
26
it. Philips’s solution was to follow an analog approach to modulating
the frequency of the “groove” on the disc, so as to insert location codes
27
onto the disc. One of Sony’s proposals to conquer this problem was to
mark location codes in the groove by using a digital modulation
28
method. Philips’s approach was later covered by two of its patents at
29
Sony
issue in this case, referred to as the “Raaymakers patents.”
prosecuted another patent to protect its corresponding technology as
30
well, referred to as the “Lagadec patent.”
The Raaymakers and
Lagadec technologies perform the same basic function in dissimilar
31
ways, and are in essence mutually incompatible. Given the fact that
both of the technical approaches could interoperate backwards with
then-existing CD players, such as CD-ROM drives, they are reciprocally
32
substitutable and in direct competition with each other.
After investigating the two contending solutions, the Sony and
Philips engineers agreed to use the Raaymakers technology, rather than
v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
22. Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
23. In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also U.S. Philips Corp.
v. Princo Corp., 173 Fed. Appx. 832, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
24. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322.
25. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1344; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1305–06.
26. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1344; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1305.
27. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322.
28. Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1305.
29. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1305.
30. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1305–06.
31. Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1306.
32. Id.
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the Lagadec approach, to solve this problem.
They consequently
incorporated the Raaymakers technology into the Orange Book
34
In the joint patent
standard for the CD-R/RW manufacturing.
packages for licensing to manufacturers, Philips included the patents
that it considered substantially necessary to produce Orange-Book
compatible CD-R/RW discs, which contained both the Raaymakers and
35
Lagadec patents simultaneously.
Those joint package licenses
contained a “field of use” restraint, limiting the licensees to employing
the licensed technologies only for the purpose of producing compact
36
discs in compliance with the Orange Book standard. Later in 2001,
following the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission handing down violation
findings against three CD-R joint licensors, Philips began to offer
additional package options, grouping relevant patents into two
categories, labeled “essential” and “nonessential,” for producing CD-Rs
37
Both the Raaymakers and Lagadec patents were
and CD-RWs.
38
classified as essential.
In the late 1990s, Princo, a company from Taiwan, manufactured
CD-Rs and CD-RWs in compliance with the Orange Book standard and
39
also covered by the Raaymakers and Lagadec patents. This company
sought to import those disc products into the U.S. market, and therefore
entered into a package license agreement with Philips for those
40
41
patents. Unfortunately, the licensing relationship did not last long.
Due to the high royalty rate of the package license, Princo soon
42
declined to pay royalties. Philips terminated the license agreement in
response, and initiated a proceeding before the International Trade
43
Philips asserted that while importing compact
Commission (ITC).
discs covered by the pooled and unlicensed patents into the United
States, Princo had violated section 337(a)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act of
44
1930, and requested the ITC to issue an exclusionary order to expel

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1306.
Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1306.
Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1306.
Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1320.
Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322–23.
Id.
Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006).
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45

Princo’s CD-R and CD-RW products from importation.
Princo
alleged the patent-misuse doctrine against Philips as its affirmative
46
defense.
The ITC initially found Philips misused the pooled patents because
the package licenses it offered were mandatory and thereby tied the
patents that were essential to fulfilling the Orange Book standard with
47
those patents that were not essential.
The Fed. Cir. reversed,
concluding that no illegal tying could be properly established regarding
patents then in question, and remanded to the ITC for further
determination of whether Philips had engaged in other behavior that
48
could be considered misuse. In the second-round proceedings, the ITC
rejected Princo’s contention that including the Lagadec patent in the
package license constituted unlawful tying arrangement, and held that
the agreement between Sony and Philips not to license the Lagadec
patent in competition with the Orange Book patent package, especially
49
the Raaymakers patents incorporated therein, was not misuse as well.
The original Fed. Cir. panel opinion agreed that the ITC had righteously
rejected the Lagadec tying claim, but erred in rejecting the misuse claim
based on the agreement not to license the Lagadec technology as a
50
substitute for Raaymakers approach adopted in the Orange Book.
However, on rehearing en banc, the entire Fed. Cir. reversed the panel
opinion and held that the agreement not to license the Lagadec patent
51
independently did not constitute misuse.
III. MISUSE ABRIDGED: DEVIATING FROM PRECEDENTS AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In addition to ruling on a non-compete agreement that might exist
45. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323.
46. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1182–83
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
47. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323.
48. Id. at 1323–24.
49. Id. at 1324.
50. Claim 6 of the Lagadec patent is arguably broad enough to embrace the
Raaymakers technology. Though uncertainty existed as to the scope of this claim, the Fed.
Cir. panel considered it would be reasonable for a manufacturer to believe a license on claim
6 was necessary when entering into the package license agreement with Philips. The Lagadec
patent would therefore be rationally classified as an essential patent for practicing the
Raaymakers technology, and the Orange Book standard as a whole. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 563
F.3d 1301, 1309–12 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
51. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323–26. The majority opinion does not disturb the
original panel’s ruling with respect to the inclusion of the Lagadec patent in the package
license not constituting unlawful tying arrangement. Id. at 1345 n.7 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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between Sony and Philips with regard to Lagadec and Raaymakers
technologies, the Fed. Cir. delivered two more limitations in the en banc
decision on the basic framework and applicable scope of the patent52
misuse doctrine. The first is that only restrictions on the use of patents
53
by the licensees would constitute patent-misuse. The second makes
clear that antitrust violations that involve extension of the patent grant
54
do not necessarily denote patent-misuse.
These rulings brought patent-misuse jurisprudence into a brand new
age. Before this decision, the existing principle for judging patent55
56
misuse was declared in Windsurfing , and reiterated in Mallinckrodt
57
and Virginia Panel , all decided by the Fed. Cir. The court in
Windsurfing framed the test as: “the alleged infringer [must] show that
the patentee has impermissibly broadened the ‘physical or temporal
58
scope’ of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.”
The two
elements that come to light from this test are broadening the patent
59
scope in effect and the broadening affecting the competition. There
was no express constraint in the test limiting misuse to restrictions
imposed on licensees only, nor was there an implied restraint to the
same effect in the Fed. Cir.’s decisions. In contrast, there have been
Fed. Cir. cases clearly pointing to the contrary. In Virginia Panel, the
court explained that an antitrust violation “requires more exacting proof
than suffices to demonstrate patent misuse,” such as evidence to
establish an intent to monopolize and damages attributable to the
60
asserted misuse conduct. The fact that fewer elements are required for
the court to substantiate patent-misuse allegations may suggest that it
enjoys a more spacious scope than that of antitrust violations similarly
involving extending the patent’s influence beyond its legal grant. The
court made the same point more straightforward in C.R. Bard. In that
case, the panel’s opinion plainly enunciated that “[p]atent misuse is
viewed as a broader wrong than antitrust violation . . . . Thus misuse

52. Id. at 1327–28.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1328.
55. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001–02 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
56. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
57. Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868–71 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
58. Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1001.
59. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.2 at 3–8.
60.
Virginia Panel Corp., 133 F.3d at 872 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140–41(1969)).
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may arise when the conditions of antitrust violation are not met.”
The pre-existing case law highlights this question: why does the Fed.
Cir. overturn its attitude in the present case? What are the factors and
underlying reasons that advise the court to make this change happen?
As expressed by the majority in the en banc decision, the rationale lies
in the pervasive protection that the law would like to provide for
patents, and a consistent fact feature in the misuse cases, which has
62
rarely been noticed in the past. The majority opinion indicated that
the patentee was entitled to substantial rights under a broad scope of
63
the patent grant.
The right to impose a variety of conditions in
licensing the patents is also one of the key capabilities possessed by the
64
patent owners.
For this reason, the doctrine of patent-misuse has
65
largely been confined to certain types of the patentee’s practices.
In light of these observations, the majority opinion narrowly reinterpreted the existing test for patent-misuse. It first emphasized that
misconduct eligible for the misuse defense had to be rooted in the “use”
66
of the patent. The majority went on to state that those restrictions that
the patentees imposed on licensees were the only type of constraining
practices targeted precisely at the “use” of the patents. Other types of
patent abuse, therefore, were not a suitable category for the misuse
67
defense. Secondly, the en banc majority considered that only those
specific practices that the courts had previously recognized as patent68
misuse could sustain such an allegation raised by the defendant. It
further analyzed the facts of past cases in which it had affirmed misuse
allegations and concrete examples referred to in the legislative process
69
of the Patent Licensing Reform Act of 1988. The opinion came to the
conclusion that in all those cases and examples, patent-misuse arose

61. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140–41 (1969)).
62. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328•29 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1328–29 (citing USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir.
1982)).
66. Id. at 1331.
67. Id. at 1329, 1331–32 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998)); See Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1971);
McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230, 238–39 (10th Cir. 1968); Republic
Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utils., 319 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1963)).
68. Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1329.
69. Id. at 1330.
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invariably from restrictions that the patentees imposed on licensees
70
It considered that this
regarding the use of the licensed patents.
similarity appeared to be a rule implied by previous courts in the
precedents. Based on this two-fold reasoning, the court consequently
added this new element, though retrieved from past decisions, into the
criteria that the defendant had to satisfy in asserting the misuse
71
defense.
A. Over-Construing Previous Decisions
If you were to check the precedents that the court recited in the en
banc decision to support its reasoning, you might be surprised that little
reference or suggestion to the restriction-on-licensee requirement, if
any, can be found. Furthermore, the reference to the “use” of the
patent, though appearing in past decisions, actually did not work to the
purpose of advocating or bolstering the requirement as such. For
instance, the conduct at issue in C.R. Bard, concerning the misuse claim,
was that the patent owner was suing for infringement with knowledge
that no actual infringement had ever occurred. The panel unanimously
concluded that because there was no substantial evidence showing this
litigation was objectively baseless and brought in bad faith, it was
insufficient to establish antitrust liability on the “sham litigation”
72
theory. The panel rejected a parallel allegation of patent-misuse as
well. In addressing this defense, the panel stressed that the misuse
doctrine should not be expanded into an “open-ended pitfall” for any
73
type of wrongful use of the patents. The misconduct asserted in this
case neither occurred in the licensing context, nor was the question of
whether it related to the “use” of the patent ever raised in assessing the
misuse claim. The panel revealed no intention to narrow the scope of
misuse and there was no reference to any restriction on licensees.
Similarly, in the Virginia Panel decision, although the Fed. Cir. referred
to “use of the patent” when describing the alleged misconduct, the case
would be better understood primarily as a tying arrangement lacking the
coercion element, thus failing to meet the test for this type of patent74
misuse. The factor of using the patent or not did not actually play an

70. Id. at 1330–33.
71. Id. at 1331.
72. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1368, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Bryson, J., concurring and dissenting-in-part).
73. Id. at 1373.
74. Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 870–71 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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important role in reaching the conclusion in this case.
Besides these two Fed. Cir. cases, the decisions that were made
before the establishment of the Fed. Cir. have generally demonstrated
similar situations. For example, in Kolene Corporation, the Sixth
Circuit stated that “[w]e know of no authority suggesting that there can
be a defense to a patent infringement suit based on ‘misuse in the
76
air’ . . . The misuse must be of the patent in suit . . . . “
The real
condition the court encountered in that case, however, was the
defendant’s contention that the plaintiff-patentee’s tying of her “service
mark” license with unpatented products amounted to “patent” misuse
77
as well. The Sixth Circuit harshly refuted this allegation in its opinion,
and reiterated the bottom line for a misuse allegation, which the Federal
Circuit quoted in the present case: “the patent in suit [must] itself
78
significantly contribute[ ] to the practice under attack.” The same
79
notion was also employed in McCullough Tool Company, a Tenth
Circuit case cited in the present Fed. Cir. decision, to rule against an offthe-mark misuse accusation. The practice at issue was the plaintiffpatentee suing approximately fifteen different operators for
80
infringement of eight to ten different patents.
Some of the
infringement allegations were dismissed after discovery ended in those
81
cases. In the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, it was clear that the plaintiff had
a reasonable basis for alleging infringement by operators of the patents
82
at issue. As for the remainder of the patents, the court indicated what
the Fed. Cir. quoted in the Princo case, that the patent-misuse defense
was allowed “only where there had been a misuse of the patent in
83
suit.” Thus, the defense in this case was confined to misconduct in
relation to, or in any manner connected with, the matter at dispute in
84
the infringement proceeding.
From the analysis above, you can see “the use of the patent” concept
barely functioned as a meaningful constraint—instead of a general and
broad delineation—of the scope of the patent-misuse defense. Nor did
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 84 (6th Cir. 1971).
Id.
Id. at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted).
McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 238.
Id.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 238–41.
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any prerequisite to patent-misuse, such as restrictions being imposed on
a licensee about how he or she exploits the patent, ever appear in prior
decisions.
In addition to over construing previous court decisions in order to
support the restriction-on-licensee requirement, the Fed. Cir. also erred
in dismissing past decisions that stood opposite to its current view. The
majority does not understand those past decisions according to their
individual contexts, and rejects their holdings too lightly. The primary
judicial decision that Princo relied on in the en banc proceeding,
85
Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., is the most prominent case that the
court misinterprets. The majority opinion distinguished the Compton
case on its facts, and denounced it for transgressing precedents by
86
finding misuse in a patentee’s self-restraint on the use of the patent. If
you reset the case back to its original context, you will easily come up
with a quite different view of this decision. By restraining its own
freedom in using the patent at suit, Compton, the patentee, struck a
non-compete agreement with its exclusive licensee in exchange for
87
royalties. More importantly, this agreement was not confined to the
patent or patented products that Compton actually licensed, but instead
covered the entire type of equipment that the Compton patent
88
connected to. In other words, the issue in this case was a cross-theboard, non-compete-and-share collusion between competitors, which is
very similar to the facts presented in the Princo case. The major
concern with this agreement was not that the patent owner constrained
its own freedom to facilitate the transaction of exclusive license, but that
the agreement eliminated the competition between the patentee and
exclusive licensee regarding the entire category of equipment. Besides
this anticompetitive effect, the agreement extended the exclusive terrain
of the patent at dispute beyond its legal scope to affect the whole
category of equipment, which satisfied the remaining element of the test
for misuse that the Fed. Cir. maintained before the Princo en banc
89
decision. The collusion, nevertheless, did not contain restrictions on
the licensee’s use of the patent, the very element that is frequently
85. Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., 453 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1971).
86. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1331 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
87. Compton, 453 F.2d at 43–44.
88. Id. at 46.
89.
See Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Virginia Panel Corp. v.
Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, (Fed. Cir. 1997); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
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missing in the decisions cited for support by the Princo majority.
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to justify why the Princo majority
excluded the Compton case from consideration, but not the decisions
actually cited in the opinion. This disparity in surveying and assessing
relevant case law would undeniably undermine the objectivity and
strength of the en banc decision, in particular, when it occurs to such a
controversial and worldwide-attended dispute.
B. Deviating from Supreme Court Precedent
Beyond the level of appellate court decisions, the more profound
problem that the Fed. Cir. currently comes across is the observable gap
between the Princo decision and prior United States Supreme Court
precedents regarding the patent-misuse doctrine. The U.S. Supreme
Court put the idea of patent-misuse forward for the first time in Motion
90
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., but it was not until its
91
1941 decision in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. that the Supreme
Court gave full shape and concrete substance, including the name of
92
“patent-misuse”, to the doctrine. Initially, in Morton Salt, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment since its
finding of misuse was not supported by evidence showing the patent
owner’s tying practices had violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the
93
corresponding antitrust law.
The Supreme Court disagreed. It
proclaimed that the key inquiry for patent-misuse is not whether the
patent owner contravenes antitrust law, but whether a court of equity
will lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when the plaintiffpatentee is using it as an effective means to forestall competition
94
beyond the scope of rights that the patent grant provides. The Court
went on to elaborate:
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent
monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, ‘to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to * * *
90. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). See 1
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.2a at 3-3 (noting the Motion Picture Patents case was
the first application of the principle embodied in patent-misuse); Robin C. Feldman, The
Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 409 (2003) (noting
this case established what later developed into the doctrine of patent-misuse).
91. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
92. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 907–09 (2007).
93. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490.
94. Id. at 490–91.
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Inventors the exclusive Right * * *’ to their ‘new and useful’
inventions. But the public policy which includes inventions within
the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in
the invention. It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an
exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent
95
Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.
The Court explicitly expressed its primary concern that underlies the
96
rise of the patent-misuse doctrine. It is the public policy to promote
the progress of innovation that further determines the balance between
what patents do and do not cover that requires the misuse doctrine to
guard against the patentee from transgressing the boundary of rights
97
granted by the patent office. The scope of patent rights is ascertained
by patent examiners through intensive and professional investigations.
Overreaching the rights beyond their boundaries may enclose
technologies commonly known or obvious for skilled artisans into a
patentee’s exclusive terrain, rewarding the patent owner for what she
does not actually invent. This type of reward would encourage freeriding on existing inventions, or stifle competition in areas the patent
office intentionally leaves open for rivalry. No matter which of the
above in fact occurs, it is definitely not these inventive activities that the
98
patent system is destined to promote. In addition to all of these, the
patent grant expanded by the misuse conduct may also encumber
subsequent inventions due to the need it generates for follow-on
inventors to clear the extended patent rights that blocks on the path of
subsequent innovation, causing another layer of disincentive similar to
anticommons or patent thickets, which have been intensively discussed
99
in recent years.

95. Id. at 492 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
96. Id.
97. See Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 484–86
(2011); Cotter, supra note 92, at 908; Feldman, supra note 90, at 409–11; Marshall Leaffer,
Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L. 142, 147–48 (2010); Joe Potenza et al.,
Patent Misuse—The Critical Balance, A Patent Lawyer’s View, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 69, 69–70,
77–78 (2005); Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922, 1925–
26 (1997).
98. The Motion Picture Patents Co. case is another source for similar analysis of the
Supreme Court’s patent misuse policy. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.2a, at 33−3-5; Feldman, supra note 90, at 405–09; Leaffer, supra note 97, at 148–49.
99. See Feldman, supra note 90, at 435; Leaffer, supra note 97, at 158. For the
anticommons theory see generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998);
Richard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research: The Case for
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According to Morton Salt, the patent policy behind the misuse
doctrine is therefore aimed at safeguarding the open field of
competition lying outside of the patent grant from the intrusion of
patent owners. Although mixed with specific tests and arguments
borrowed from antitrust law to assist in deciding misuse in individual
100
cases, the high court has consistently kept the same patent policy as its
chief concern when applying the misuse doctrine.
The Court
maintained this principle all the way through to the most recent cases it
handled relating to the misuse doctrine. It articulated in Zenith Radio,
the last case in which the Supreme Court found misuse, that a patentee
might not use the power of his patent to levy a charge for activities not
101
within the reach of the patent as granted by the government. In the
same vein, in the Blonder-Tongue decision, the final case where the
102
Supreme Court discussed the basic rationale of this doctrine, the
Court’s opinion referred to prior misuse cases as “the series of decisions
in which the Court has condemned attempts to broaden the physical or
103
temporal scope of the patent monopoly.”
In quoting Mercoid, the
Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251, 280–87
(2008). Relatively speaking, anticommons theorists put more emphasis on massive patents
one may face in the research and development process. “Patent thickets” are a similar notion
with a somewhat different focus. It stressed patent proliferation on the end products or their
manufacturing processes. For a discussion of patent thickets see Carl Shapiro, Navigating the
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
100. Some commentators argued the mixture with antitrust considerations blurred the
misuse doctrine with antitrust policy, turning that doctrine into “a common law of antitrust.”
J. Dianne Brinson, Patent Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
357, 369–75 (1990); Note, supra note 97, at 1926. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court
indicated in Transparent-Wrap Machinery Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., which the
commentators cited to support their argument, a misconduct that transgressed the patent
boundary and demonstrated anticompetitive tendency, though falling short of antitrust
violation, could still be condemned as patent-misuse. 329 U.S. 637, 641 (1947). This holding
fully exemplified that the misuse doctrine has separate and independent, though
complementary and sometimes similar, policy underpinnings than that of antitrust law. See
also Potenza et al., supra note 97, at 70–71 (supporting antitrust considerations in determining
patent misuse cases).
101. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 136–37 (citing Brulotte
v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964)).
102. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J.,
dissenting); Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., is the last misuse case that the U.S.
Supreme Court considered, but it concentrated only on the issues of contributory
infringement and statutory interpretation of § 271(c)–(d) of the 1952 Patent Act. 448 U.S. 176
(1980). Even so, Justice Blackmun described the misuse doctrine for the majority in brief: “a
patentee should be denied relief against infringers if he has attempted illegally to extend the
scope of his patent monopoly." Id. at 180–81.
103. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971).
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Court unequivocally pointed out: “[t]he method by which the monopoly
is sought to be extended is immaterial. The patent is a privilege . . . . It
104
results from invention and is limited to the invention which it defines.”
After tracing back previous Supreme Court decisions on patentmisuse, it is more evident that the restriction-on-licensee requirement is
a newly-created affix to the misuse doctrine, yet it is undeniably
inconsistent with the principle that the Court already delivered in a
series of cases regarding this defense. Since 2006, there has been an
increasing number of Fed. Cir. decisions reversed by the Supreme Court
in the area of patent law. The cases that have been overturned in this
105
106
107
108
period include eBay, MedImmune, KSR, and Quanta Computer,
all involving Fed. Cir. case law that already drifted away from Supreme
Court precedents predating the Fed. Cir’s establishment in 1982. In
those cases, the Supreme Court continuously set aside category-specific
rules gradually instituted by the Fed. Cir., and brought the law back to
the more general, flexible, and open-ended rules as crafted in its prior
109
decisions.
In fact, the Princo en banc decision created a specific
requirement for asserting the misuse defense, and arguably deviated
from Supreme Court precedent. The Princo decision possessed nearly
all the listed features shared in the series of overturned cases since 2006.
Even if it survives a petition for certiorari, the holdings in the Princo
decision may still be vulnerable to future challenges, and will possibly
110
have to live an unstable and contentious life.

104. Id. at 344 (citing Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944)).
105. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
106. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
107. KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
108. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
109. Hill Wellford, Is the Supreme Court Importing Antitrust Economics into Patent
Law? A Different Look at eBay, MedImmune, KSR, and Quanta Computer, THE ONLINE
MAGAZINE FOR GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY, MARCH 2009, at 12–14.
110. See Princo Corp. v. ITC, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (2011) (certiorari denied). The preexisting Fed. Cir. rule actually requires defendants asserting the misuse defense to prove
anticompetitive effects such as unreasonable restraint on competition and foreclosure to the
extent similar to an antitrust claim. See Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860,
869 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (discussing antitrust
law)); U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Such a requirement
might also contradict with earlier Supreme Court precedents. See Feldman, supra note 90, at
401–02; see also HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.2a, at 3–6 (acknowledging that the
Fed. Cir. substantially cut back the scope of patent-misuse, confining it predominantly to
conduct also violating antitrust law); Bohannan, supra note 97, at 490 (indicating that the
Supreme Court’s misuse finding in Motion Pictures Patents Co. did not rely on antitrust law,
but was firmly grounded in its IP policy).

WANG- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

11/15/2011 11:06 AM

DEVIATED, UNSOUND, AND SELF-RETREATING

69

C. Neglecting Legislative History
With regard to the relationship between the patent-misuse doctrine
and antitrust law, it has been argued that with the enactment of the
Patent Misuse Reform Act in 1988, Congress intended to confine the
111
scope of the misuse doctrine to bring it in line with antitrust law. If
you look into the real process of that amendment to the Patent Act,
however, you will perceive the legislative intent quite differently from
that description. The Senate first passed a bill that would have the
misuse defense truly coexistent with the antitrust rules. It stipulated
that misuse findings could not be sustained unless the patent owner’s
112
“practices or actions or inactions . . . violate[d] the antitrust laws.”
The House nonetheless preferred retaining patent-misuse as a distinct
doctrine. Instead, the House counterpart, House Report 4086, recited
113
the categories of restrictions that most courts had identified as misuse.
Through mutual compromise, the two chambers of Congress eventually
reached consensus. The enacted amendment only added a safe harbor
to the Patent Act to shelter two specific types of practices from the
114
misuse defense. The first category is refusal to license, and the second
is tying arrangements where the patent owner fails to possess market
115
power in the relevant market.
The entire legislative process undoubtedly demonstrated that
Congress not only had no intention of confining the scope of patentmisuse to the antitrust terrain, but instead, positively maintained the
defense as a lone standing doctrine with coverage broader than its
antitrust counterpart. In the Princo en banc decision, however, the Fed.
Cir. majority announced that antitrust violations, even involving
116
extension of the patent grant, would not necessarily constitute misuse.
With this ruling, the Fed. Cir. arguably reduced the misuse scope to be
even narrower than antitrust. This judicial move did not follow the
legislative intent of keeping the broader scope of the misuse doctrine

111. See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
112. Jere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuse: Developments
in the Misuse Doctrine, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 264 (citing the Intellectual Property
Antitrust Protection Act of 1988, S. 438, 100th Cong. § 201 (1988)).
113. H.R. 4086, 100th Cong. (1988). See also 134 Cong. Rec. 3261 (1988) (statement of
Rep. Robert Kastenmeier); Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an Alleged Infringer Prove
an Antitrust Violation?, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 3–4 (1989).
114. Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an Alleged Infringer Prove an Antitrust
Violation?, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2 (1989); Webb & Locke, supra note 112, at 264–65.
115. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (2006).
116. See, e.g., Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1328.
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intact: running against the will of Congress as expressed in the last
revision of the pertinent patent statutes. Accordingly, these rulings by
the Fed. Cir. were unable to find affirmative support from the legislative
history of the 1988 amendment.
IV. UNSOUND POLICY DECISION: CONSTRAINING EQUITABLE
FLEXIBILITY
The reasoning put forth in the Princo decision, with regard to adding
the restriction-on-licensee requirement for patent-misuse, is not
sufficiently clear and abundant. The majority referred to retaining the
pervasive protection of patent rights as its primary rationale, and
consequently, narrowly controlled the scope of the misuse doctrine as a
117
defense to patent infringement. However, there lacked a link in logic
between the majority’s reasoning and the restriction-on-licensee
requirement. Without proper judicial precedents as its basis, why did
the majority choose restriction-on-licensees as a suitable new element to
control the scope of patent-misuse instead of other possible manners,
such as tightening the interpretation of the existing misuse test or
leveling up the evidentiary requirement for proving elements already
118
contained in the misuse test?
The opinion did not answer this
question, nor did it provide any rationale connecting the new element to
the court’s underlying concerns. Therefore, a gap in logic resulted in the
court’s reasoning regarding the new requirement of the misuse doctrine.
In addition to this logical gap in reasoning, the majority’s new
limitation may also generate false negatives in identifying misuse. As
the Fed. Cir. stated in B. Braun Medical, the patent-misuse doctrine is
119
an extension of the equitable tort law doctrine of unclean hands. . The
guiding principle for that doctrine is the maxim “he who comes into
120
equity must come with clean hands.” While “equity does not demand

117. Id. at 1328–29. See also id. at 1322–23; Pinco Corp. v. ITC, 563 F.3d 1301, 1306,
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
118. Beginning with Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the Fed. Cir. has made
use of heightened evidentiary requirement to control damage awards in patent infringement
lawsuits. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp, 632
F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2009 WL 1405208 (N.D.N.Y. May 15, 2009).
119. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing
Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed.Cir.1986)). See also Morton Salt Co. v.
G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
120. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814
(1945); Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 241 (1933).
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121

that its suitors shall have led blameless lives,” the maxim does require
that plaintiffs shall have acted reasonably, with conscience, and without
122
fraud or deceit as to the matters they raise in litigation.
For the most part, courts are concerned with their integrity when
applying the clean hands doctrine. Thus, the maxim entrusts a broad
range of equitable discretion with courts in refusing to assist unclean
litigants who attempt to make use of the judicial procedure in bad
123
faith. The equity court “is not bound by formula or restrained by any
limitation that tends to trammel the free and just exercise of
124
discretion.”
In the same spirit, a court of equity will not lend its support to
enforce a patent that has been misused. It will be preferable for patentmisuse to stay open and flexible, in order to encompass all possible
types of misconduct that adversely affects the opposing parties in the
125
same litigation based on the patent at issue. This flexibility will offer
the courts broad but necessary discretion to shy away from
accommodating inequitable patent owners who may achieve
unreasonable gains through judicial procedures, which in turn would be
of vital importance for the courts to preserve their integrity as the
126
administer of justice.
The facts in the present case provide a good example illustrating the
possible type of patent abuse that would be expelled from the scope of
the misuse doctrine by the restriction-on-licensee requirement.
Assuming arguendo, that Philips and Sony colluded to prevent licensing
the Lagadec patent separately with an aim to avoid a workable digital
resolution of encoding the position information to be developed and
121. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934).
122. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 814–15; Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit
Co., 321 U.S. 383, 387 (1944); Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 245–46. See also Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 877 (1949).
123. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 815; Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873,
881 (3d Cir. 1959). See also T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of
Unclean Hands, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 509, 527–41, 558–59 (2010).
124. Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 245–46. See also Gaudiosi, 269 F.2d at 881;
Bishop v. Bishop, 257 F.2d 495, 500 (3d Cir. 1958).
125. The qualified claimant of patent-misuse is not limited to the defendant that is
actually affected by the asserted misbehavior. The Princo en banc decision left this problem
untouched. For the need to establish standing requirement for the misuse doctrine see Mark
A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 1599, 1618–19 (1990); Infra section IV.3.
126. Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 793, 796 (1988). See also Feldman, supra note 90, at 417;
Leaffer, supra note 97, at 157.
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compete with Philips’s Raaymakers analog technology. The colluded
constraint was on Sony, a licensor, and thus failed to fulfill the
restriction-on-licensee requirement, and therefore, was not a patentmisuse in the majority’s mind. One group of victims under this
collusion, however, was CD-R/RW manufacturers. They suffered from
high royalty rates and no alternatives in the encoding technology, yet
were sued for infringement in the present case precisely due to the fact
that they were unable to afford the expensive royalties resulting from
the conspiracy.
Excluding that conspiracy from patent-misuse
regretfully deprived the court of the necessary discretion in declining to
execute that collusion against its victims. The outcome contradicted the
basic concerns of the unclean hands doctrine, and conspicuously
demonstrated the significance of equitable flexibility for the patentmisuse doctrine.
Professor Merges hypothesized another perfect example of this
127
point.
Suppose a pharmaceutical company successfully develops an
AIDS vaccine but refuses to sell or manufacture directly or through
licensing in certain states because the rule of strict liability in those
states makes it risky, or at least too burdensome, for the firm to make
128
and distribute the vaccine. Would it be an advisable choice for courts
to enforce the patent monopoly against residents in those states, barring
them from using the vaccine to prevent the deadly disease and to save
129
human lives? Should the courts be compelled to excuse that specific
use of the patent rights from misuse allegations, just because it does not
contain a restriction-on-licensees?
Actually, apart from the patent-misuse doctrine, restraint-oncompetition is a common ground for unenforceability in contract and
property law. The focal points for judging unenforceability in this
130
aspect are reasonableness of the constraint,
its impact on
131
132
competition, and whether it is ancillary to a valid transaction. All of
127. Merges, supra note 126, at 796–97.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.6 (2000) (providing
that “[a] servitude that imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade or competition is
invalid.”). See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACT § 5.3, at 322–23, 326–28 (4th ed.
2004).
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186(2) (1981) (providing that
“[a] promise is in restraint of trade if its performance would limit competition in any business
or restrict the promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation.”).
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 187–188 (1981). See also
FARNSWORTH, supra note 130, § 5.3 at 323–26.
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these factors are flexible, open-ended conceptions. No rigid limitation is
built in to affect their adaptability. This hundred-year common law
wisdom should be of considerable value for contemporary patent courts.
In light of the foreseeable polymorphism and unforeseeable strains of
potential misbehaviors, it will be much wiser and pragmatic for the Fed.
Cir. to maintain greater range and considerable flexibility, and, in the
meantime, to refrain from creating restrictive requirements with regard
to the applicable scope of the patent-misuse doctrine.
V. FUNCTIONAL SELF-RETREAT: A GAP WITH ANTITRUST
If using antitrust law as a yardstick in assessing the impact that the
Princo decision brought about to the patent misuse-doctrine, one may
obtain a more comprehensive understanding in the implications of this
case. With adoption of the restriction-on-licensee requirement, this
decision excluded from the misuse doctrine those antitrust violations
that involve patent right extension and anticompetitive restraint not
explicitly imposed on the licensees. Recognizing the equitable nature
and spirit of unclean hands, as embodied in the misuse doctrine,
however, the misbehaviors set aside by this ruling do not appear to be
truly “clean” and qualify for the court’s aid with its execution. Given
the fact that misconduct violating section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act—
the key antitrust statute—are all felonies, it is really bizarre to hold that
part of them merit the court’s protection and enforcement. Are there
any meaningful differences between the two categories that the decision
treated differently, in particular, in terms of the potential inequity those
misconducts may generate to defendants? As long as the antitrust
violations cannot be possible but for the patentees’ extension of patent
rights beyond the patent grant, those violations have encroached the
key thrust of the misuse doctrine, and nearly no reasonable ground
133
could be raised to save them from the misuse allegations. Against this
backdrop, it is not a surprise that Judge Prost made a candid remark in
his concurring opinion: “
I do not share the majority’s apparent view that antitrust
considerations are an entirely ‘different issue,’ separate and apart
from the question of whether there has been patent misuse . . . .
Whether use of a patent runs afoul of antitrust law seems in itself
133. Though stated in dictum, the Supreme Court indicated in Ill. Tool Works Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc. that “[i]t would be absurd to assume that Congress intended to provide that
the use of a patent that merited punishment as a felony would not constitute ‘misuse.’” 547
U.S. 28, 42 (2006).
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probative of whether the patent owner has also abused, or
134
‘misused,’ the limited monopoly granted by Congress.
A. Retreating from Anticompetitive Behaviors
In the present case, Phillips based its asserted conspiracy with Sony
on its CD-R/RW patents, and expanded the patent rights beyond the
boundary set by the patent office. Using the Raymakers and other
Orange Book patents as its cornerstone, Philips had three types of
leverage to suppress the Lagadec technology. First, Philips might
oppose the Lagadec patent from being listed as essential for compliance
with the Orange Book standard or selected into the joint-license
package administered by Philips. Second, Sony might not be able to
enjoy a considerable share of the royalties accruing from the jointlicense package as it did in the present case. In return for an
insubstantial contribution to the Orange Book standard, Sony was
rewarded a significant portion of the royalties. For example, the
Lagadec patent was nearly the only essential patent that Sony possessed
in the CD-RW license package. Notwithstanding, Sony received 36% of
135
the royalties accruing from CD-RW joint licenses.
During the
development of the CD-RW specification, Sony employees were
136
described as “more observers than real active developers.” Lastly, in
order to enforce its alleged conspiracy with Sony, Philips could have
refused to license the Orange Book patent package to the licensee of
the Lagadec patent to punish Sony for cheating in their conspiracy and
137
to suppress the emergence of alternative technology. These were all
pivotal bargaining chips that Philips might have utilized in exchange for
a non-compete-and-share agreement with Sony.
In antitrust law, the noncompetition covenant, or market division
agreement among horizontal competitors, might more often than not be
analyzed under the rule of reason, on a condition that it is not a naked
restraint on trade but is ancillary to a normal transaction or joint
138
venture.
Sometimes it is possible, however, that the court analyzes
134. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Prost, J.,
concurring) (citing U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 468 (1957) (emphasis
added)).
135. Id. at 1344–45 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1345 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (discussing testimony of Dr. Jacques Heemskerk,
a Philips employee).
137. Id. at 1338.
138. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001); Metro Indus. v.
Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776
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this type of agreement under a per se illegal rule, and regardless of
which rule is analyzed, it does not necessarily pass antitrust scrutiny.
For example, the Supreme Court applied the per se rule to a non139
compete agreement in Palmer v. BRG.
The agreement in question
involved an excessive territorial market division between two competing
140
bar review course providers in Athens, Georgia. The Court held this
non-compete agreement was in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
141
Act.
In the present case, given the fact that there was no sufficient
evidence to prove the agreement between Philips and Sony was
necessary for their cooperation in developing the Orange Book
standard, but instead some pieces of evidence indicated to the
142
contrary, the non-compete agreement at issue might not be an
ancillary restraint that could be readily justified under antitrust law. In
other word, the agreement between Philips and Sony may be considered
as a naked restraint that should be analyzed under the rule of per se
illegal, which does not permit taking into account asserted efficiency
gains of the cooperation between competitors. Without offsetting
efficiencies from the joint venture to weigh against possible
anticompetitive harms that the agreement generates to technology
development and competition regarding CR-R/RW position
information recording, the Philips-Sony conspiracy will probably have a
net adverse impact on competition. With adopting the restriction-onlicensee requirement and shrinking the scope of misuse to be narrower
than antitrust, however, the Fed. Cir. eschewed from suppressing this
negative patent practice. Instead, it chose to implement the monopoly
of Orange Book standard and technologies that the conspiracy
contributed to sustain against the victimized CR-R/RW manufacturers.
Unfortunately, this holding disappointedly contradicts the court’s task
of delivering and administering justice.
A thorough reflection,
therefore, appears to be paramount for the court to apprehend its vital
role and grave responsibilities in regulating patent-abusing behaviors.

F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th
Cir. 1983).
139. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
140. Id. at 46–48.
141. Id. at 49–50.
142. The record shows the Lagadec technology was separately developed by Sony and
presented to Philips, and was not a collaborative invention. Besides the collusion at issue,
there was no overall agreement that inhibited Sony from competing with the Orange Book
joint venture. See Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1355 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Dyk, J., dissenting).
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B. Functional Needs to Complement Antirust
Apart from specific misconduct that the court might require, there
are apparent gaps in the misuse doctrine and antitrust law that resulted
from the Fed. Cir’s new rule. Respondents of section 337 proceedings
before the ITC can not raise antitrust counterclaims. The patent-misuse
doctrine is therefore the only defense respondents can rely on to
repudiate the complainant’s anticompetitive behaviors. Consequently,
reducing the scope of the misuse doctrine would seriously affect the
respondent’s procedural right to effectively defend against illegitimate
allegations in an adjudicative process. The respondents, whose misuse
defense was ruled out, will have to initiate private antitrust litigation
separately before the district court. The complex situation of multiple
litigations will materially impede speedy resolution of the entire dispute,
143
and drain valuable resources of the parties and the courts.
Accordingly, relaxation of the control on the misuse doctrine, at least
allowing it to encompass the entire field of antitrust law, is inevitably a
necessary measure to avoid the multi-forum intricacy from routinely
happening in section 337 proceedings. In order to prevent a new class of
antitrust lawsuits from being constantly initiated in the district courts,
the Fed. Cir. needs to carefully reconsider its rulings and newly imposed
requirement in its Princo decision.
Beyond the ITC proceedings, patent-misuse is also capable of
complementing the function of antitrust law. U.S. antitrust law has long
since suffered from over-deterrence due to the treble damage recovery
144
awarded in private litigation.
For this reason, antitrust law has
developed a number of over-prudent rules and doctrines to constrain its
private enforcement. An “antitrust injury” must be demonstrated
145
before private lawsuits can proceed to a jury trial. At the federal level,
a “direct-purchaser” rule is in place to prohibit indirect purchasers from

143.
See, e.g., Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941);
Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of
the Multidistrict Litigation Panel's Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2253–54 (2008);
William W. Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss, & Alan Hirsh, Judicial Federalism in Action:
Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1690 (1992).
144.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 66–68 (Harvard University Press 2005).
145. The antitrust injury requirement asks the plaintiff to show her loss flow from the
anticompetitive aspect of the alleged unlawful behavior, instead of the procompetitive aspect
of the same conduct. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d
1356, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986).
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146

recovering their losses from an antitrust offense.
For instance, if a
manufacturer violates antitrust law, causing damages to distributors and
consumers of Product A, only those consumers that purchased Product
A directly from the manufacturer can sue for damages. Those that
purchased from dealers and other distributors are not eligible to bring a
lawsuit against the manufacturer. These procedural thresholds and the
heavy burden of proving market power in a well-defined relevant
147
market could together give rise to the under-enforcement of antitrust
law, especially in small or medium-scale violations. In contrast, the
misuse doctrine does not possess such a dreadful remedy, as it has fewer
procedural and evidentiary requirements. It is much more suitable for
dealing with small or medium-scale misbehaviors that the scant antitrust
enforcement may not adequately cover. Abstaining from using this tool
to regulate a substantial part of patent abuse not targeted at licensees,
as the Fed. Cir. proclaimed in the Princo decision, will be a pity in light
of its functional advantages. A mutual supporting and complementing
system of collaborating antitrust law and the misuse doctrine with fuller
coverage will be a more balanced and satisfactory configuration.
C. Establishing a Requirement for Standing
Some commentators advocate total abolition of the patent-misuse
doctrine, calling to replace it with antitrust law. The key point of their
argument is the substantial overlapping of this doctrine with antitrust
rules, the latter seeming to be a more well-developed body of law with
148
regards to regulating potential anticompetitive behaviors.
Overlapping in itself is scarcely sufficient to vindicate the eradication of
a legal doctrine. For instance, tort law and criminal law surely have
regulated a vast, but common range of human activities, but abolishing
one of them has barely been an issue of discussion. The reasoning
behind this phenomenon is two or more layers of regulation may
sometimes be more preferable than a sole and concentrated one. The
true factor for their abolition lies instead in unnecessary waste and
complexity. The doctrine of patent-misuse has different goals and
146. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728−29 (1977). See also Princo Corp. v.
ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting); Hovenkamp, supra
note 144, at 72–76.
147. For the difficulty in market definition and market power measurement, see e.g.,
Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1805, 1807–09, 1813–18 (1990); Frederick M. Rowe, Market as Mirage, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 991, 991–96 (1987).
148. The most prominent figure in this camp is Judge Posner. See USM Corp. v. SPS
Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
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principles than antitrust law. As a defense in infringement suits, the
doctrine emphasizes the prevention of patent owner’s circumvention
149
over the patent boundary. The misuse and antitrust regimes also have
divergent remedies and procedural postures. U.S. antitrust regime has
its own weak points, such as ITC section 337 proceedings and strict
requirements for private litigants, where the misuse doctrine can
150
precisely play a positive role in filling in those gaps. It would not be a
layer of redundant regulation as those commentators denote.
Other critics of the misuse doctrine were focused on the difference
between its remedy and the harm that misbehaviors generate, in
particular the rule that every infringer of the patent can lodge the
151
misuse defense no matter whether she is personally victimized or not.
The origin of this defense—the unclean hands doctrine—is not a
regulatory scheme that manipulates the punishment in proportion to the
harm that the misbehavior achieves. The focus of this doctrine turns on
the question of whether the plaintiff’s pleading merits the aid of the
court as the custodian of justice. From this perspective, proportionality
might not be the only and best standard to determine the success or
demise of the misuse doctrine. This does not mean that the misuse
defense should be available to irrelevant patent infringers. Patent
owner’s misbehaviors that have no relation with the transaction or
market at question will not impinge upon the alleged infringer in the
specific infringement litigation. It will be a pure windfall for unaffected
infringers to claim the misuse defense based on the suffering of
someone else. In order to avoid rewarding infringers who do not suffer
from the patentee’s misbehaviors, a requirement on standing to confine
the misuse defense to those who are actually affected by the alleged
misbehaviors should be established.
The integrity of justice
administration will not be tainted if the court executes the patent right
against unaffected infringers. Traditionally, the doctrine of unclean
152
hands also retains a similar limitation to prevent abuse.

149. See supra Part II.2.
150. See supra Part IV. 1−2.
151. Cotter, supra note 97, at 902, 908−09; Lemley, Comment, supra note 125, at
1614−20.
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 32
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004) (describing the unclean hands doctrine as “a party guilty of
inequitable conduct in the underlying transaction may on that account be denied a claim”)
(emphasis added).
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Princo en banc decision appears to be another important step
by the Fed. Cir. to restrain the strength and scope of the patent-misuse
doctrine. The court began the long course in 1986 in the Windsurfing
case, where it imposed a new element, “having anticompetitive effect,”
to the Supreme Court’s traditional test for this defense. In the present
case, the Fed. Cir. majority proceeds to create another element—
restriction-on-licensees only—to the existing criteria. There is no
reliable way to assure what mobilizes the court to forge such a long and
consistent endeavor in controlling this doctrine. The court has not
sufficiently disclosed specific rationales and overall evaluations that
support this project. As acknowledged in this article, the misuse
doctrine needs improvement, such as adding a new requirement on
standing to confine it to infringers actually suffering from the misuse. A
substantial curtailment of this doctrine, however, still seems too early to
stage. Through detailed analysis of the Princo decision, this essay
demonstrates that the holding of this case deviates from Supreme Court
precedent and previous Fed. Cir. and appellate court precedent. It also
ignores the importance of equitable nature and discretional flexibility
originally embedded in the doctrine. Functionally speaking, the court’s
ruling retreats from suppressing certain patent abuse, creating evident
gaps and disjuncture with antitrust law. It is the author’s hope that the
Princo decision is an end to the beginning, not a beginning to end.
Instead of substantially weakening the misuse doctrine, this decision
could be an excellent stimulus and starting point for careful reflection
on its function, foundation, and better configuration.

